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ABSTRACT  
Bank regulators recently proposed the most fundamental reforms to U.S. 
banking law in decades, yet the value-at-risk statistic—replete with known 
deficiencies—remains the basis of the capital adequacy requirement.  
Consequently, there exists an unresolved tension in the law: the purpose of the 
banking rules is to require riskier financial institutions to hold additional capital, 
yet the value-at-risk statistic used to make this assessment induces a perverse 
incentive to hold the riskiest securities.  Overlaid on this framework is the wide 
latitude afforded to banks in designing their value-at-risk models.   
This Article explores foreseeable issues with the regulatory reliance on 
value-at-risk.  Moreover, it details specific problems associated with the design 
and implementation of this risk measure in the context of the capital adequacy 
requirement.  The analysis draws on empirical data and uses advanced 
econometrics to engage these issues with the sophistication used at financial 
institutions.  The Article introduces a supplemental risk measure that may mitigate 
the incentive for banks to hold the riskiest securities, and may allow regulators to 
introduce a system of capital surcharges accordingly.   
“[O]perations for profit should be based not on optimism but on arithmetic.”1  
I. INTRODUCTION 
In June 2012, U.S. banking agencies released three notices of proposed 
rulemaking and one final rule that collectively represent the most fundamental 
change in financial regulation since the introduction of risk-based capital 
requirements in 1989.2  The new regulatory landscape will largely resemble the 
Basel III framework, despite some important differences.3  The reforms will have 
profound implications for the future of banking practices in the U.S. and abroad, 
but the effectiveness of the banking rules as a safeguard against future financial 
crises remains an open question.4   
At the center of the regulatory debate is the capital adequacy minimum: the 
appropriate type and quantity of capital that a bank must hold to be compliant with 
U.S. law.5  The purpose of the capital adequacy minimum is to ensure that banks 
do not overextend themselves and become unacceptably vulnerable to 
underperforming loans and macroeconomic shocks.6  In this way, the capital 
adequacy minimum is the amount of ballast necessary to ride out a financial storm.  
                                                            
1 BENJAMIN GRAHAM, THE INTELLIGENT INVESTOR 523 (4th ed. 2003). 
2 See 12 C.F.R. pt. 3 app. B (2012); Regulatory Capital Rules: Regulatory Capital, Implementation 
of Basel III, Minimum Regulatory Capital Ratios, Capital Adequacy, Transition Provisions, and Prompt 
Corrective Action, 77 Fed. Reg. 52,792, (Aug. 30, 2012) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pts. 324–25, 362) 
[hereinafter Proposed Rules].   
3 See Proposed Rules, supra note 2, at 52,792.  Among other reforms in connection with bank 
capital adequacy minimums, the Basel III framework involves modifying the definition of regulatory 
capital, altering the minimum capital ratio, and introducing the capital conservation buffer, the 
countercyclical capital buffer, and the Global Systemically Important Bank capital requirement.   
4 See generally id.   
5 See 12 C.F.R. pt. 3 app. B § 1(a).   
6 See generally VIRAL V. ACHARYA ET AL., REGULATING WALL STREET 143‒44 (2010). 
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At the same time, an excessively burdensome capital adequacy minimum will 
curtail lending operations and limit the funds available to corporations that require 
it for sustained growth.7   
Since the publication of Basel I, U.S. regulators have embraced a risk-based 
approach to the capital adequacy minimum by requiring banks with riskier assets 
to maintain more capital in order to offset the higher statistical probability of loss.8  
In particular, existing regulations focus primarily on credit risk and market risk.9  
Credit risk is based on the possibility that the loan counterparty will default on its 
payment obligations,10 and market risk is based on the possibility that trading 
securities will drop in value.11   
Unfortunately, the proposed reforms leave the market risk rules materially 
unaltered with respect to the value-at-risk statistic—the basis of the market risk 
calculation—even though it systematically underestimates risk exposure and 
contributed to the financial crisis.12  Even more troubling, present regulations 
allow banks to construct their own black box value-at-risk models with few 
meaningful restrictions on the underlying statistical assumptions.  As a result, 
banks enjoy considerable discretion in the implementation choices that ultimately 
determine their capital adequacy minimums.  Despite this latitude, there is no 
requirement to disclose the final algorithm used in these bespoke models.  This 
lack of visibility seems at odds with Dodd Frank’s call for “improv[ed] 
accountability and transparency in the financial system . . . .”13   
This Article asks two important questions: First, how effective is value-at-
risk as a capital adequacy measure for trading securities?  Second, where are the 
points of discretion regarding the underlying statistical assumptions, and how great 
is their impact?  This Article takes a very hands-on approach to answering these 
questions by using empirical data from domestic equity markets, reports from the 
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), and sophisticated econometrics 
where appropriate.   
The organization of the Article follows the form of the questions.  Part I 
introduces the conceptual design of value-at-risk and explains its perverse 
incentive for banks to overinvest in tail risk.  Part I goes on to use empirical data to 
demonstrate the discretion that banks enjoy in making favorable statistical 
assumptions that influence their capital requirements.  Part II spotlights the specific 
deficiencies of current regulations in curbing the problematic incentives that arise 
when banks construct their own undisclosed value-at-risk models.   
Part III of the Article proposes “risktesting” as a regulatory tool intended to 
complement existing regulations and mitigate the unresolved incentive for banks to 
                                                            
7 See DOUGLAS J. ELLIOT, A PRIMER ON BANK CAPITAL 22 (2010).   
8 See BASLE COMM. ON BANKING SUPERVISION, INTERNATIONAL CONVERGENCE OF CAPITAL 
MEASUREMENT AND CAPITAL STANDARDS 8 (1988) [hereinafter BASEL I].   
9 See 12 C.F.R. pt. 3 app. A § 1(a) (2012); app. B § 1(a).   
10 See 12 C.F.R. pt. 3 app. A § 1(a)(1); BASEL I, supra note 8, at 9–10.   
11 12 C.F.R. pt. 3 app. B § 2.   
12 Joseph Nocera, Risk Mismanagement, N.Y. TIMES MAG. (Jan. 2, 2009), http://www.nytimes.
com/2009/01/04/magazine/04risk-t.html?pagewanted=all.   
13 See Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection (Dodd-Frank) Act, Pub. L. No. 
111–203, 124 Stat 1376 (2010). 
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overinvest in the riskiest securities.  The analysis explains why risktesting is not 
vulnerable to the shortcomings of alternative approaches and then develops the 
various strengths of risktesting through a worked experiment that simulates the 
type of dataset that regulators receive from banks.  The introduction of risktesting 
as a potential regulatory reform to address the unresolved incentive for banks to 
assume excessive risk concentrations is the primary contribution of the Article to 
the existing academic literature.   
II. THE CHALLENGE OF RISK MEASUREMENT: A STATISTICAL PERSPECTIVE 
During the financial crisis, many banks with substantial trading books 
sustained large mark-to-market losses that inched them closer to insolvency 
because they underestimated the market risk of the assets in their trading book.14  
As a result, prominent banks collapsed, 15  others required emergency federal 
funding to remain afloat,16 and credit markets came to a grinding halt.17  Failures 
in the financial sector spread to the real economy resulting in double-digit 
unemployment and negative economic growth.  Many critics blamed value-at-risk 
as an inadequate risk management tool and the cause of a regulatory failure.18   
The crisis emphasized the need for market risk banks to hold additional 
capital in order to protect themselves from the impact of another loss.  Bank 
regulations require market risk banks—national banks with trading activity on their 
call report19 greater than or equal to $1 billion or 10% of total assets on a 
consolidated worldwide basis—to hold extra capital because of the potential loss 
from trading activity.20   Therefore, market risk banks have a higher capital 
adequacy minimum that reflects the value-at-risk of their trading securities.21   
The concept of risk is foundational to the risk-reward tradeoff of modern 
portfolio theory, but it is a difficult notion to quantify.  In fact, banks used a 
number of different statistics before value-at-risk came to predominate.22  One 
measure was volatility, defined to be the standard deviation of asset returns.23  
Volatility is a sensible risk measure because it captures the dispersion of asset 
price movements and agrees with the intuition that a smoother, more reliable 
                                                            
14 See, e.g., Mark Landler, Losses at Deutsche Bank Reflect Depth of Credit Crisis, N.Y. TIMES 
(Apr. 29, 2008), http://www.nytimes.com/2008/04/29/business/worldbusiness/29iht-bank.4.12440904.
html; Louise Story, Morgan Stanley Posts $2.36 Billion Loss, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 17, 2008), http://www.
nytimes.com/2008/12/18/business/18morgan.html.   
15 FIN. CRISIS INQUIRY COMM’N, FINANCIAL CRISIS INQUIRY REPORT 289 (2011), available at 
http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/GPO-FCIC/pdf/GPO-FCIC.pdf.   
16 See id. at 362–63.   
17 Markus K. Brunnermeier, Deciphering the Liquidity and Credit Crunch 2007–2008, J. ECON. 
PERSP. Winter 2009, at 77, 85–86, 90.   
18 See, e.g., Nocera, supra note 12; see also JORGE MINA & JERRY YI XIAO, RETURN TO RISK-
METRICS 73–74 (2001).   
19 The call report is the Report of Condition and Income.  It is a quarterly report to the Federal 
Financial Institutions Examination Council, which distributes the reports to the regulatory agencies.  
The information includes balance sheet and income statement reports.   
20 12 C.F.R. pt. 3 app. B § 1(b)(1)(i)‒(ii) (2012).   
21 See id. § 4(a).   
22 See PHILIPPE JORION, VALUE AT RISK 113 (3d ed. 2006).   
23 See id. at 76.   
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stream of gains is less risky than a process of erratic returns.  Still, volatility suffers 
from a directionality problem because the occurrence of one large gain has the 
same impact on the volatility computation as an equally large loss.  In this way, 
volatility is not a downside risk measure.   
Other common statistics are deficient at the portfolio level because they 
cannot aggregate across disparate asset classes.24  These calculations use the 
sensitivity of an asset to a particular risk factor.  These sensitivities, however, are 
not comparable because they are defined in different units.  For instance, there is 
no meaningful comparison of interest rate risk of a bond with the beta risk of a 
stock because they measure different risk sensitivities.25   
Value-at-risk resolves the directional issue by considering only trading 
losses.26  Further, value-at-risk is capable of inputting trading securities across 
multiple asset classes and outputting a single measure for the entire portfolio 
because it computes risk in terms of dollars regardless of the financial 
instrument.27  Still, there is no unique value-at-risk algorithm.  Instead, value-at-
risk is a statistical concept that leaves wide discretion to market risk banks in 
creating their models that in turn form the basis of their capital adequacy 
requirement.28   
A. The Design 
Market risk banks use the value-at-risk statistic because the gain or loss at 
the end of the trading day for a financial asset is probabilistic, meaning that the 
outcome may take any value along a continuum of potential returns.29  Each 
potential return realization has its own probability.  Even if it is impossible to 
determine in advance whether the asset will experience an uptick or downtick in 
price, it is still possible to estimate the probabilities associated with these potential 
returns.   
In general, the observed probabilities for the potential returns form a bell-
shaped curve because smaller gains and losses are more likely than larger ones.30  
Still, the particular shape of the bell curve differs depending on the risk level 
associated with the particular asset.31  For example, a riskier asset may exhibit 
extreme fluctuations in value.32  Therefore, the relative probability of extreme 
returns will be greater, the relative probability of modest returns will be lower, and 
the bell curve will have a flatter appearance.33  By contrast, a more conservative 
                                                            
24 See CAROL ALEXANDER, VALUE-AT-RISK MODELS 5 (2008); see also JOHN C. HULL, OPTIONS, 
FUTURES, AND OTHER DERIVATIVES 435 (6th ed. 2006).   
25 See JORION, supra note 22, at 76; see also HULL, supra note 24, at 76.   
26 For this reason, value-at-risk is often called a downside risk metric.  See, e.g., ALEXANDER, 
supra note 24, at 9.   
27 See Thomas J. Linsmeier & Neil D. Pearson, Value at Risk, FIN. ANALYSTS J., Mar.‒Apr. 2000, 
at 47, 48; MINA & XIAO, supra note 18, at 66.   
28 See 12 C.F.R. pt. 3, app. B § 4 (2012).   
29 See JORION, supra note 22, at 79–80.   
30 See JORION, supra note 22, at 88. 
31 Id.   
32 Id. 
33 Id. 
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asset will exhibit few extreme fluctuations and will therefore have a tighter, more 
peaked bell curve representing a greater probability of slight gains and losses.34  
The value-at-risk statistic involves two steps: First, a model estimates the 
probability distribution for the returns of the financial portfolio by fitting an 
appropriate bell curve.35  Second, the model identifies the particular return along 
the continuum that represents the specified percentage cutoff.36  For example, if 
the bank wants to determine the 95% value-at-risk, then the model will identify the 
return on the continuum for which the sum of probabilities to the right of that 
return total 95%.  If the model is accurate, then there is a 95% chance that the 
financial portfolio will beat the trading return that the model identified.  It is 
equivalent to say that there is only a 5% chance that the bank will sustain trading 
losses worse than the 95% value-at-risk.   
The design of value-at-risk hides potentially catastrophic losses because it is 
an ordinal statistic that simply ranks the universe of possible trading outcomes 
according to their magnitude and probability.37  Ordinal statistics—such as the 
minimum, maximum, median, and percentiles—are useful as high-level descriptive 
summaries of a dataset, but are blind to outliers.  Consequently, value-at-risk 
describes the order of potential returns, but ignores the spacing between successive 
returns thereby ignoring losses in the tail of the distribution.38  For example, the 
95% value-at-risk identifies the loss for which the sum of probabilities to the right 
of that return total 95%.  The next potential return beyond this threshold could be 
an incrementally larger loss or a catastrophic loss, but value-at-risk is blind to the 
difference.  For example, the value-at-risk of a portfolio could be a loss of $100 
million, and the next worse potential return could be a loss of $101 million.  Just as 
easily, however, the next worse potential return could be a loss of $200 million.   
 
In Figure 1, the 95% value-at-risk is identical for both distributions because 
the summation of the probability bars starting from the gains side moving leftward 
                                                            
34 Id. 
35 See JORION, supra note 22, at 106‒07. 
36 Id. 
37 Some academic literature uses the term quantile statistic, but the terms are interchangeable.  See 
generally id. at 88‒92.   
38 See, e.g., HULL, supra note 24, at 436–37.   
Figure 1. As an ordinal statistic, value-at-risk looks to the order–not the spacing–of potential asset returns in the
probability distribution of a financial portfolio. As a result, a risky portfolio and a conservative portfolio may have
the same value-at-risk if the catastrophic losses of the risky portfolio are hidden in the tail of the distribution.
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until reaching 95% identifies the same trading return for both distributions.  The 
two distributions are identical up to the percentage cutoff, so the value-at-risk is 
the same.  In this way, value-at-risk hides the catastrophic losses and fails to adjust 
the capital adequacy minimum of the risky portfolio.  
 
Table 1. JPMorgan: Value-at-Risk
Primary Market 95% 99%
Risk Category Cutoﬀ Cutoﬀ Increase
Fixed Income 160 221
Foreign Exchange 18 30
Equities 47 75
Commodities and Other 20 32
Diversiﬁcation (91) (131)
Trading Value-at-Risk 154 227 47%
SEC Disclosures. Average One-Day VaR for Year Ended 12/31/09 
 
The 2009 JPMorgan annual report demonstrates how quickly potential losses 
beyond the 95% threshold can mount because the value-at-risk for the 99% cutoff 
is almost 50% greater.39  This comparison is useful because both value-at-risk 
calculations utilize the same estimation techniques, calibration period, and other 
model assumptions.  An increase of 4% in the percentage cutoff corresponds to an 
almost 50% increase in potential trading losses.   
Banks face a perverse incentive to overinvest in tail risk in order decrease the 
value-at-risk of the portfolio and lower their capital adequacy requirements.40  If, 
for example, banks want to express a view of the market, they can lower the value-
at-risk calculation by holding extremely risky assets because the potentially 
catastrophic losses are hidden deep in the tail of the distribution.  Moreover, the 
lower reported value-at-risk makes the bank appear to possess a stronger balance 
sheet.   
A state contingent last period problem occurs if the bank would be unable to 
sustain catastrophic losses, so there is no disincentive against holding additional 
risk related to that particular source of loss.  A last period problem is state 
contingent if the losses arise only in a certain state of the world.  In the value-at-
risk context, the relevant state of the world is a loss in the particular trading 
security that the leads to the catastrophic losses.  For example, a bank that writes 
deep out-of-the-money put options will face losses only if the underlying asset 
experiences very extreme, very unlikely losses.  If a bank wrote so many options 
that it would become insolvent during a payout event, then there is no disincentive 
against writing additional options of the same kind.  Therefore, banks holding the 
most extreme tail risk have the least disincentive not to increase that position.   
B. The Implementation 
In addition to a regulatory design that incentivizes suboptimal risk exposure, 
value-at-risk involves implementation choices about statistical assumptions that 
                                                            
39 JPMorgan Chase & Co., Annual Report (Form 10-K), at 119, 121 (Feb. 24, 2010). 
40 12 C.F.R. pt. 3 app. B, Section 5.   
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have important consequences for the overall capital adequacy computation.41  
Common assumptions introduce a downward bias in risk estimates, so many banks 
hold less capital than necessary because managers have a false sense of security in 
risk management practices at the bank.   
The statistical challenge in quantifying market risk is complex because a 
properly specified model must capture the probability distribution of portfolio 
assets individually, collectively, and as they evolve over time.  The marginal 
distribution of individual assets often does not match the symmetry and tails of 
theoretical distributions thereby introducing a downward bias in the probability 
estimate of extreme losses.  Further, the co-movement structure of assets 
collectively is non-linear and therefore difficult to describe with intuitive models.42  
Finally, the marginal distribution and co-movement structure are time varying as 
the broader financial markets transition between periods of stability and distress.43   
i. Three Value-at-Risk Methodologies 
U.S. regulations require market risk banks to add a market risk adjustment to 
their capital adequacy requirements by using any of three value-at-risk 
methodologies: the historical, Monte Carlo, or variance-covariance.44  Specifically, 
market risk banks must use a 99%, one-tailed, ten-day value-at-risk calculation 
based on a calibration period of at least one year.45  Banks choose the value-at-risk 
methodology based on the asset classes they hold and the complexity of their 
hedging strategy.   
The most intuitive approach for banks trading stocks, bonds, and other 
traditional securities is the historical methodology because it simply replicates the 
historical gains and losses that would have resulted from a buy-and-hold strategy 
of the present portfolio.46  Moreover, the method makes no assumptions about the 
distribution of the assets other than assuming that past returns reflect future 
returns.47  It is possible to replicate the historical returns of the portfolio by simply 
constructing a weighted average of the historical returns of the assets.48  The 
returns of the replicated portfolio form a historical distribution that yields the 
value-at-risk estimate.49   
This methodology is unsuitable for illiquid or bespoke securities such as 
                                                            
41 See Tanya Syblo Beder, VAR: Seductive but Dangerous, FIN. ANALYSTS J., Sept.‒Oct. 1995, at 
12, 12 (explaining that “[a] review of dozens of dealers’ and end-users’ VARs revealed radically 
different approaches to the calculation. . . . [E]ight common VAR methodologies were applied to three 
hypothetical portfolios . . . . [T]he magnitude of the discrepancy among these methods is shocking, with 
VAR results varying by more than 14 times for the same portfolio.  These results illustrate the VAR’s 
extreme dependence on parameters, data, assumptions, and methodology.”).   
42 See JORION, supra note 22, at 207.   
43 See id. at 219.   
44 12 C.F.R. pt. 3 app. B note 10.   
45 12 C.F.R. pt. 3 app. B § 4 (d)(1)(2).   
46 See Romain Berry, An Overview of Value-at-Risk: Part II—Historical Simulations VaR, J.P. 
MORGAN, http://www.jpmorgan.com/tss/General/Risk_Management/1159369485859 (last visited Mar. 
18, 2013).   
47 See ALEXANDER, supra note 24, at 141.  
48 See id.   
49 See id.   
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structured products and over-the-counter derivatives because a long history of 
reliable prices is often unavailable, especially in thinly traded markets.50  Many of 
these securities exist because of recent financial engineering and therefore lack the 
financial record necessary to estimate the distribution.51  Many large banks trade 
these sophisticated instruments, so the historical methodology is typically 
appropriate only for small banks and traditional asset classes.  
Banks trading highly complex financial derivatives often favor the Monte 
Carlo methodology because it can estimate value-at-risk even when the payoff 
structure of the derivative is too complicated for a direct mathematical 
computation.52  The Monte Carlo methodology uses a random number generator to 
produce a dataset simulating the distribution of the underlying asset and then feeds 
those individual data points into the payoff structure of the derivative one-by-
one.53  The resulting values form a simulation of the distribution of the derivative, 
which is the basis for the value-at-risk calculation.54   
The Monte Carlo methodology is practical for complex derivatives, but 
simulations are computationally intensive and generally less helpful for measuring 
risk exposure and developing hedging strategies.55  By contrast, a methodology 
using equations can describe risk exposure more easily.56  For example, the Black-
Scholes equation values a call option as a function of the underlying stock price, 
interest rate, drift, volatility, and time to maturity.57  Using calculus, it is possible 
to isolate the sensitivity of the derivative to adverse changes along any one of those 
risk dimensions and thereby allow banks to hedge more effectively.58   
The last permitted approach is the variance-covariance methodology, which 
assumes that financial assets individually and collectively follow a particular bell-
shaped distribution with certain algebraic properties that make the value-at-risk 
calculation straightforward. 59   The term “variance-covariance” refers to a 
mathematical matrix with statistical estimates for the co-movement of each asset 
with each other asset.60  When the matrix is inputted in the mathematical equation, 
the result is a multivariate distribution describing the entire financial portfolio.61  
The equations themselves make critical assumptions regarding the distribution of 
the assets with important consequences for the value-at-risk estimates.  
This Article examines the variance-covariance methodology because of its 
                                                            
50 See id. 
51 See id. at 145.   
52 See ALEXANDER, supra note 24, at 201; Romain Berry, An Overview of Value-at-Risk: Part 
III—Monte Carlo Simulations VaR, http://www.jpmorgan.com/tss/General/Risk_Management/ 
1159380637650 (last visited Mar. 18, 2013);  see, e.g., JORION, supra note 22, at 308.   
53 See JORION, supra note 22, at 267.   
54 See id.   
55 See id.   
56 See, e.g., HULL, supra note 24, at 353.   
57 See id. at 295.   
58 See id. at 241; see also JORION, supra note 22, at 255.   
59 See Romain Berry, An Overview of Analytical VaR, J.P.MORGAN, http://www.jpmorgan.com/tss/
General/email/1159360877242 (last visited Mar. 18, 2013). 
60 See RICHARD A. JOHNSON & DEAN W. WICHERN, APPLIED MULTIVARIATE STATISTICAL 
ANALYSIS 68–70 (6th ed. 2007).  
61 Id. at 150. 
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prominence in the financial industry.62   
ii. The Marginal Distribution 
The market risk calculation requires assumptions regarding the marginal 
probability distribution, which is the movement of a single random variable such 
as the returns process of a financial asset.63  This is the starting point for a more 
comprehensive value-at-risk model that describes an entire portfolio of multiple 
asset classes.  The Gaussian probability distribution is the most common 
assumption for the movement of observed returns, but this assumption does not 
match the heavy tails and asymmetry of the empirical returns.64  As a result, the 
Gaussian distribution underestimates market risk and biases the capital adequacy 
minimum to a lower value.   
 
 
 
a. The Gaussian Distribution65 
 
The variance-covariance methodology uses the Gaussian probability 
distribution—a mathematical equation describing a family of bell-shaped curves—
to model the marginal distribution of financial assets returns.66  The Gaussian 
distribution is a practical choice to describe the marginal distribution because it 
captures the majority of asset returns.67  Moreover, the equation is algebraically 
tractable and effortlessly extends to higher mathematical dimensions, meaning that 
the variance-covariance methodology can describe a portfolio holding any number 
of financial assets.68 
It is relatively easy to calculate value-at-risk because only two parameters, 
the mean and variance, are required to complete the Gaussian equation,69 or are the 
parameters computationally intensive to estimate.70  Perhaps most importantly, the 
natural interpretation of the Gaussian parameters comports with the intuition of 
traders about the average return and volatility of the asset.  For instance, the mean 
                                                            
62 Nocera, supra note 12. 
63 RENÉ A. CARMONA, STATISTICAL ANALYSIS OF FINANCIAL DATA IN S-PLUS 63 (George Casella 
et al. eds., 2004).   
63 Id. 
64 Id. at 35.   
65  
             
The Univariate Gaussian Distribution:
f(x) =
1
p
2πσ2
e
− (x−μ)
2
2σ2
 
66 See MINA & XIAO, supra note 18, at 13.   
67 See MINA & XIAO, supra note 18, at 95–96.   
68 See JOHNSON & WICHERN, supra note 60, at 149.   
69 DENNIS D. WACKERLY, WILLIAM MENDENHALL III, & RICHARD L. SCHEAFFER, MATHEMATI-
CAL STATISTICS WITH APPLICATIONS 170 (Carolyn Crockett et al. eds., 6th ed. 2002).   
70 See, e.g., id. at 372.   

